Possessory Interests: A Tax Without a Test by Dale, Karen L.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-1985
Possessory Interests: A Tax Without a Test
Karen L. Dale
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Karen L. Dale, Possessory Interests: A Tax Without a Test, 25 Santa Clara L. Rev. 65 (1985).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss1/2
POSSESSORY INTERESTS: A TAX WITHOUT A TEST?
Karen L. Dale*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although less well known than the familiar sales or ad valorem
property taxes, California's possessory interest tax constitutes a sig-
nificant source of revenue for the state.1 The possessory interest tax
is actually a species of real property tax," and is imposed upon those
with certain rights to use or possess state or federal lands.' In the
last two decades the number and type of property rights that have
been held to be subject to the tax have increased dramatically."
This article analyzes the factors currently used to test whether
or not a taxable interest exists, examines the validity of this test, and
comments upon recent extensions of the tax. The article concludes
with a discussion of the proper factors that should be considered to
determine whether a taxable possessory interest exists, and with sug-
gestions for possible modifications to the taxable interest test.
II. NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE TAX
California's tax on possessory interests must be understood as
part of the state's constitutional mandate which requires that all
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1. The possessory interest tax dates back to 1859, when the state asserted the tax against
holders of gold-mining rights in public lands. State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 (1859). The As-
sessor's Handbook, [hereinafter cited as AH 5171 revised in 1974, estimates that income to the
state from possessory interest taxes is "many millions of dollars," and forms a "substantial part
of the property tax base for our counties, cities, and school districts." AH 517 at 1. Because
nearly half of California's land is public domain, the possessory interest tax assumes greater
significance than it might for other states. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA
PROPERTY 94 (2d ed. 1979).
2. The possessory interest tax only applies, with one exception, to interests in real prop-
erty. See infra note 23.
3. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 107 (Deering 1975). Technically, a possessory interest in
privately-owned land also could be separately assessed, but except where an exempt entity
owns the underlying fee, there is no practical reason to separate the interests subject to taxa-
tion. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at 93. See also infra note 85 and accompanying
text.
4. Compare the lists of "typical" possessory interests for 1967 and 1976 cited in Com-
ment, The California Possessory Interest Tax: A Time Honored Concept Gets a New Twist,
17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 827, 848 n.94 (1977). That commentator suggests that the recent
expansion may be attributed to an attempt to find revenue to "combat the rising costs of en-
larged governments." Id. at 828 n.5.
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property, unless specifically exempted, be taxed according to its full
value.5 When the property is owned by the state or federal govern-
ment, the fee itself will not be subject to taxation.' However, this
immunity from taxation does not extend to private parties using gov-
ernment-owned lands because "[e]xemption from taxation is a privi-
lege of the Government, not an incident of the property."'"
Early cases articulated the rationale for imposing the tax as an
attempt to equitably apportion the tax burden:
"These possessions . . . are . . . a species of property ....
Why should [the holder] not contribute its proper share, accord-
ing to the value of the interest, . . . of the taxes necessary to
sustain the Government which recognizes and protects it? ' '8
Thus, the earliest conception of the possessory interest tax required
that it be applied to rights of possession in public lands which were
significant enough to constitute "property" in the hands of the
holder.
It was not until 1947, however, that the California Supreme
Court articulated a precise set of standards designed to determine
when a possessory right constituted a taxable possessory interest. 9 In
the landmark case of Kaiser Co. v. Reid,10 the state supreme court
established three criteria to determine when a possessory interest ex-
ists: 1) a user must possess a right to use and to possess public land
existing for an ascertainable period; 2) the interest must be exclu-
sive; and 3) a private benefit must be received by the possessor."
During the next twenty-five years the judiciary elaborated upon this
theme,12 but only these basic factors were incorporated, with some
expansion, into the California Adminstrative Code in 1971.18 The
test for a possessory interest restated therein requires exclusiveness,
5. CALIF. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 107 (Deering 1975).
6. The doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation is well-established. See Metcalf
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
The federal government may, if it chooses, waive such immunity. See United States v. County
of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). Counties similarly may not tax state-owned land. CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 202 (Deering 1975) (state, county or city-owned property is exempt).
7. Moore, 12 Cal. at 71.
8. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 657 (1866); see Comment, supra note 4, at 830-31
(1977).
9. See Comment, supra note 4, at 830-31.
10. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 869 (1947).
11. Id.
12. See generally Comment, supra note 4, at 833-52.
13. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 21-28 (1977) [hereinafter cited in text as the
Regulations).
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durability, independence and private benefit. 4
These factors are intended to provide a flexible standard, rather
than a rigid test, to evaluate interests in public lands on a case-by-
case basis." Although courts must weigh the extent to which each
factor is present,"6 all four factors must be present to some degree in
order to support a finding that a particular interest is possessory, and
therefore taxable. 17
III. ANALYSIS OF THE POSSESSORY INTEREST TEST
The four criteria now used to determine whether a taxable pos-
sessory interest exists provide a superficial definiteness and specific-
ity. A closer examination reveals, however, that the standards pro-
vided are of dubious utility and do not address all of the factors
which should be considered in determining the existence of a taxable
possessory interest.
A. Property
It is fundamental to the imposition of the possessory interest tax
that the interest in question constitute "property," although this is
not expressly listed as a factor in the Regulations. The legislature
has defined property to include "all matters and things, real, per-
sonal, and mixed, capable of private ownership."' 8
Courts often gloss over this basic requirement by noting that
"the use and possession of public lands in California has always
been regarded as a valuable species of property.""9 Because all non-
14. Although not expressly mentioned in the Regulations, the requirement of a private
benefit has been clearly established by case law. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 21(a)(i)
(1977); see Wells Nat'l Servs. Corp. v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 715 (1976). Indeed, at least one commentator considers that the private benefit factor
now occupies a position of overriding importance. Comment, supra note 4, at 839, 842-43.
15. Mattson v. County of Contra Costa, 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646,
648 (1968); 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, 4 CAL. TAX. § 82.04[3][a]. This departure from
the fixed standard established in Kaiser has been criticized as an "erosion" of the structure and
certainty previously afforded; Comment, supra note 4, at 833-38, but was intended to assist in
dealing with the variety of interests that may be created by the ingenuity of contracting parties.
4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER at 82-23.
16. Mattson, 258 Cal. App. 2d at 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
17. Wells, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal. Rptr. 715. However, the "private benefit"
factor may outweigh the others as a practical matter. See Comment, supra note 4, at 842-43;
see also 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at 82-23 (stating that when private
benefit and exclusiveness are present, the other factors are likely to be found).
18. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 103 (Deering 1975).
19. Comment, supra note 4, at 839 (describing the Archer court's approach as
"typical").
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exempt property is subject to tax,20 the court can then conclude that
the interest is taxable without resorting to a more rigorous analysis.
However, this conclusion may be too facile. Certain intangible
interests, although clearly "property," are exempt from property
tax.2" It could be argued that certain possessory interests, for exam-
ple, those created by grazing permits, are intangible rights in tangi-
ble property and therefore are similar to other intangible, nontaxable
rights, such as those created by a deed of trust or a liquor license.22
Because a grazing permit is not one of the interests classified as in-
tangible by statute, this argument would have to be made by analogy
to nontaxable intangible rights. Similar arguments have succeeded in
the past."'
Another argument that certain possessory interests should not
be considered property subject to tax is that they are not property for
other purposes. For instance, certain rights in public land are not
compensable in condemnation proceedings2 or upon termination of
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 212 (Deering 1970) (exempting notes, debentures,
shares of capital stock, solvent credits, bonds, deeds of trust, mortgages, and any interest in
such property). See also Roehm v. Orange County, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 290, 196 P.2d 550, 556
(1948) (liquor licenses exempt from tax); Todd v. Los Angeles Co., 57 Cal. 2d 684, 690-91, 21
Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (1962) (copyrights exempt).
22. This argument has been advanced in one treatise with respect to the interest of a
concessionaire who provided rental televisions to public hospital patients. Wells Nat'l Serv.
Corp. v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 585, 126 Cal. Rptr. 715, 719 (1976).
The Wells court found a taxable possessory interest existed. Id. However, the treatise suggests
that this opinion is questionable on several grounds, including the argument that a right to
provide property is really an intangible interest. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at
96.
23. See Roehm v. Orange County, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P. 2d 550 (1948); Todd Co. v.
Los Angeles Co., 57 Cal. 2d 684, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1962). See also K. EHRMAN & S.
FLAVIN, supra note 1, at 107-08.
The question of whether the interest is a type of property subject to tax should be clearly
distinguished from that of whether the interest is in a type of property permitting the interest
to be taxed. For example, possessory interests in personal property are generally exempt from
the possessory interest tax. The exception is for possessory interests in personal property of a
California Pollution Control Financing Authority; see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 201.5
(Deering Supp. 1984); AH 517, at 9. See also Comment, supra note 4, at 831 n.19. In-
tangibles may fall into both groups: neither the intangible property itself nor any interest in
such property is subject to tax. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 212 (Deering 1970). With respect
to grazing rights, the stronger argument clearly is that the interest itself is intangible. It seems
unlikely that the interest would be construed to be in an intangible. The physical occupation of
the land by the cattle suggests, if nothing else, a "storage" use of the real property.
24. Loss of a grazing permit, unlike a grazing lease, is not compensable in condemna-
tion proceedings. Compare United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 867 (1951) and Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944) with United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in San Bernardino Co., 296 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
(differentiating leases from permits because leases are "property" and entitle their holders to
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the right;25 similarly, these rights may not be depreciated as may
other property.20 The argument is that the government should be
required to be consistent; if the interest is not "property" for pur-
poses beneficial to the holder, it should not be considered property
for purposes detrimental to other holders. At least one court faced
with this issue examined the limited nature of the interest and con-
cluded that although the holder's property rights did not extend to
compensation for termination (as they did not extend to the underly-
ing fee), those rights nevertheless were "property" in nature, albeit
limited in scope.2
Similarly, it could be argued that the distinction made in older
case law between a lease, which could be a taxable possessory inter-
est, and a license, which could not, was premised on a determination
that licenses do not rise to the level of a property right that should be
taxable .2  This reading is supported by cases minimizing the impor-
tance of a license as a "mere privilege.' '9 The possessory interest tax
is, of course, rationalized as an attempt to require those making
"valuable use of land" to contribute their fair share in taxes,30 and
even a license may be quite valuable. 1 Thus, the Regulations have
taken the position that a possessory interest may exist "regardless of
how the interest is identified in the document by which it was cre-
ated ... ."2 In addition, the lease/license distinction could perhaps
be explained as merely an outgrowth of the "exclusivity" require-
ment."3 However, the notion that certain interests are not substantial
compensation in a condemnation proceeding).
25. Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 726, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379, 386
(1971).
26. See Kermit Uecker, et al. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 514, 520 (1983) (depreciation
on grazing permits not allowed because the permits were renewable and therefore had an
indefinite life).
27. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 726, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The Archer court presumably
would have reached the same conclusion with respect to lack of condemnation compensation.
The court noted that grazing leases were subject to compensation in condemnation proceedings,
but did not discuss authorities indicating that a loss of permits may not be compensable. See
supra note 24.
28. Kaiser, 30 Cal. 2d at 619, 184 P.2d at 885.
29. Bowman v. Udall, 243 F. Supp. 672 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 878
(1966); Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1969). This distinction has also been in-
voked recently in a finding by the state board that a blind vendor in a public building had a
mere license and not a taxable possessory interest. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at
§ 3.7 (Supp. 1984) (citing letter to County Assessors, March 21; 1980).
30. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 657 (1866).
31. See 43 C.F.R. § 4130.8 (1984) (permit may be pledged as security); Osborne, 145
F.2d 892, 895-96 & n.5.
32. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 18, R. 21(a)(1) (1977).
33. The Kaiser court apparently believed that lessees would have exclusive use of the
1985]
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enough to warrant treatment as a property right seems intuitively
correct. It is superficial to argue that restrictions may affect the scope
of an interest but not its nature; the nature of an interest is in part a
function of the restrictions that apply to it." The issue has yet to be
fully explored.
B. Exclusivity
Under the test promulgated by the California Supreme Court in
Kaiser Co. v. Reid,85 exclusivity was present whenever a person had
the right to possess land "against all the world, including the
owner." '' s The notion of exclusivity, however, was severely eroded by
subsequent case law, until it came to mean only that no other inter-
ests were overtly conflicting or hostile."'
The Regulations adopt this counter-intuitive definition of "ex-
clusivity," providing that:
'Exclusive use' means the enjoyment of a beneficial use of land
or improvements, together with the ability to exclude from occu-
pancy by means of legal process others who interfere with that
enjoyment . . . .Exclusive use is not destroyed by one or more
of the following:
(1) Multiple use by persons making different uses of the same
property in such a manner that they do not prevent the enjoy-
ment of co-existing rights held by others, as, for example, the
development of mineral resources by one person and the enjoy-
ment of recreational use by others;
(2) Concurrent use when the extent of each party's use is lim-
ited by the other party's right to use the property at the same
time, as, for example, when two or more parties each have the
independent right to graze cattle on the same land . . ..
property, while mere licensees would not. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
34. For instance, an interest in fee is a real property interest, while the more restricted
leasehold is considered personalty.
35. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 619, 184 P.2d 879, 885 (1947). See supra notes 10-11 and accom-
panying text.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Mattson v. County of Contra Costa, 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 210-12, 65
Cal. Rptr. 646, 649-50 (1968) (refreshment concessionaire at public golf course had "exclu-
sive" possession even though the clubhouse was open to the general public). See also Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 835 n.37.
38. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 21(e) (1977). After the issuance of the Regulations in
1971 (and no doubt in reliance thereon), the case law has continued to apply this eviscerated
definition of exclusivity. See Sea-Land Services v. County of Alameda, 36 Cal. App. 3d 837,
842, 112 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (1974) (right to load and unload vessels at public harbor termi-
nal was "exclusive" despite multiple users, where taxpayer had priority rights in case of "busi-
ness need"); see also Seatrain Terminals of Calif. v. County of Alameda, 83 Cal. App. 3d 69,
[Vol. 25
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Thus, "exclusivity" requires only that the "valuable private
benefit conferred by the contract itself" be exclusive. 9 Because it is
unlikely that anyone would enter a contract unless it conferred some
benefit, it would seem that under this test any contractual right
would technically confer an "exclusive" benefit."
C. Durability
The durability factor stems from the Kaiser requirement that
an interest have a "determinable period."' 1 Later cases have con-
trasted durability with "impermanence.' '42
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether durability is in-
tended to refer to the unconditional nature48 of an interest, or to its
duration." The opposite of either could be considered an "imperma-
nent" interest. For instance, an unrestricted right to use land for one
day arguably could be "durable" because the period is fixed and the
right is unconditional. On the other hand, the brevity of such a right
could be construed as making it "impermanent."'" The Regulations
147 Cal. Rptr. 578, (1978) (use was exclusive despite multiple users); and Archer, supra note
25, at 726-27, (citing the Regulations' statement that multiple users under grazing permits will
not destroy exclusivity).
The court in Archer gave at least a nod to the possibility that directly conflicting uses
would prevent exclusivity, noting that "Although there is a danger that the government could
grant more grazing permits for cattle than the grazing land could hold, this is a very remote
danger ...." Archer, supra note 25, at 725, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385. Thus, it would seem
clear that at least where other users prevent full enjoyment of the resources, the courts are
willing to concede that the requisite "exclusivity" is not present. But see infra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
39. Comment, supra note 4, at 835 n.37.
40. It is difficult to conceive of a contract giving one only a right to compete with others
for beneficial use of the land. Even such a right, however, could be considered to result in a
private benefit. Without the right to compete, there would be no chance for beneficial use of
the land. Obviously, the value of such an interest would be less than the value of noncompeti-
tive users' rights.
41. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 618.
42. Mattson, 258 Cal. App. 2d at 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
43. For instance, one authority suggests that an interest that is revocable at will would
not be durable. 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at § 82.04[3].
44. Cases site terms of 5 to 20 years. See infra note 45. Despite the specified term, one
authority suggests that agreements subject to cancellation on short notice presumably also
would not qualify, if the cancellation option were likely to be exercised at any moment. 4
PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at § 82.04[3]. When the past history of the
parties indicates that a cancellation provision will not be exercised, sufficient durability has
been found present. Freeman v. County of Fresno, 126 Cal. App. 3d 459, 179 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1981); 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at § 82.04[3].
45. See 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at § 82.04[3] n.89 (focusing on
the duration of an agreement, and noting cases involving terms of 5 to 20 years).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
do nothing to clarify this ambiguity."' Arguably, then, the "durabil-
ity" test requires nothing more than an interest not be terminable at
will.
A related concept that is addressed by the Regulations is the
"continuity" of an interest. 47 The requisite degree of continuity will
vary depending on "the location and character of the property," but
will be present whenever the property is used "to substantially the
same extent as would an owner engaged in the same activity."'
8
Thus, intermittent use of the property is sufficient to establish a pos-
sessory interest when the interruption of the use is dictated by factors
outside the user's control.' 9 Several questions remain, however.
What if the interruption is purely a matter of the user's preference,
as opposed to external limitations? Even an owner clearly subject to
taxation could conceivably make unpredictably recurrent use of land.
Is any repetitive use thus sufficient? How do the concepts of durabil-
ity and continuity interact?
A closer examination of the "continuity" criterion suggests that
it is, in fact, a nontest. Uninterrupted use will always be "continu-
ous;" use interrupted by weather or other conditions will amount to
substantially the same amount of use as an owner would make and
thus will be deemed "continuous;" and use that is voluntarily inter-
rupted logically should not affect a "continuous" right to use the
land. The only remaining possibility is an interest that allows only
sporadic use of the land in a way not typical of an owner's use and
not dictated by external factors which would affect an owner. An
example would be a right to graze cattle on federal lands on Tues-
days only. As the ludicrousness of this example illustrates, it is un-
likely that any such "interest" would exist because such use would
be impractical.
The continuity test was probably intended to allow recurrent
but nonconsecutive uses to be treated as continuous and thus "dura-
ble." However, as explained above, few interests are likely to lack
continuity. Thus, the continuity test seems to add little to the mini-
mal requirements arguably necessary for "durability."' 0
46. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 21 (1977).
47. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 22(a) (1977).
48. Id.
49. For example, in Dressier v. County of Alpine, 64 Cal. App. 3d 557, 134 Cal. Rptr.
554 (1976), grazing permits were issued for only a part of each year, but this term apparently
was dictated by weather or other conditions. Here the Forest Service land was snowbound and
"unavailable for grazing until about June of each year." 65 Cal. App. 3d at 563. The short-
ness of available use may, of course, affect the interest's value. d. at 564.
50. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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D. Independence
The independence factor, although not one of the original three
Kaiser criteria,51 was foreshadowed by Kaiser's requirement of a
right to use and private benefit.5" This factor requires that the ex-
empt landowner not control the interest-holder's use of the property.
The rationale behind this requirement is that control indicates that
the user is a mere agent of the owner; if this is the case, the owner's
immunity from tax5 extends to user's activities.5"
As a practical matter, the existence of an agency relationship
may be difficult to prove when any private benefit is present, 5 espe-
cially a benefit not related to the scope of the user's employment
activities. 56 Further, at least one court has found that certain types of
control by the owner merely reduce the value of the possessory inter-
est, rather than negate its existence. 57 Consequently, lack of indepen-
dence will rarely be found, suggesting that this factor is of limited
utility.
E. Private Benefit
The private benefit requirement which was one of the original
Kaiser factors, was not expressly incorporated into the Regulations,5 8
but has become a dominant factor in courts' analyses of possessory
51. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
52. Comment, supra note 4, at 836 n.43 ("separate interest" notion was implicit in
possessory interest rationale from its inception).
53. See supra note 6.
54. See Pacific Grove-Asilomar Operating Corp. v. County of Monterey, 43 Cal. App.
3d 675, 117 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1974) (holding a nonprofit corporation's use of land in managing
facilities of a state park to be exempt as a mere agency, when the state reserved control of the
park's budget, inventory and fees).
55. See, e.g., McCaslin v. DeCamp, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967)
(government employee not an "agent" despite occupying land as a condition of employment);
United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 638, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548, 550 (1975),
af'd, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (rangers occupying government-owned houses in federal forests are
not "agents," as the right to live in such houses served purposes beyond those of the govern-
ment/employer); Comment, supra note 4, at 853 ("It will be a clever advocate who can per-
suade the court [that an agency argument] is true.").
56. Compare Pacific Grove, 43 Cal. App. 3d 675, with cases cited in note 55, supra.
57. Freeman v. County of Fresno, 126 Cal. App. 3d 459, 178 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981)
(amusement machine operator was subject to county control of number, type and placement of
the machines). Such "control," however, might be viewed merely as a threshold restriction on
the site to be used, rather than control over an agent's activities. It is interesting that the
agency argument was not raised.
58. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R. 21 (1977) and note 14 supra. The Regulations
do, however, require that the user be able to exclude interfering parties from the land by legal
process, a right that arguably constitutes a per se private benefit. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18,
R. 21(e).
19851
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interests.6 9
Because possessory interest taxes are intended to prevent an un-
due advantage to users of public lands and to ensure an equitable
distribution of the tax burden, 0 it is logical that the tax be imposed
only where the user is expected to derive some benefit from the use.
However, the concept of private benefit, like that of exclusivity, has
become severely attenuated in recent years as courts have applied the
possessory interest tax to an expanded variety of interests. Cases
have now established that a use need not generate a profit in order to
produce a "private benefit."" Further, the "benefit" conferred may
be relatively slight.6" It is difficult to conceive of a right to use public
lands worth paying a fee to obtain-or, for that matter, worth utiliz-
ing-which could not be said to produce a private benefit under this
test. Viewed in this light, the "private benefit" requirement is tauto-
logical; if a right is worth obtaining, it has value to the individual
user and thus produces a private benefit.
It seems, then, that the possessory interest requirements as cur-
rently applied have ceased to have any exclusionary force. Although
the tax would probably survive a constitutional attack on grounds of
vagueness,"' the test should be re-examined to ensure that the spec-
trum of possessory interests has not been unduly expanded.
59. See Comment, supra note 4, at 842, and note 14, supra.
60. 4 PETERSON, PLANT & EAGER, supra note 15, at § 82.04[31[a]; Comment, supra
note 4, at 831 n.18, 852.
61. Rand Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 2d 585, 50 Cal. Rptr. 698
(1966) (nonprofit corporation using federally-owned improvements found subject to possessory
interest tax); McCaslin v. DeCamp, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967) (employee's
use of government housing was taxable, even though such residency was a condition of his
employment); Lucas v. County of Monterey, 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 135 Cal. Rptr 707 (1977)
(use of public harbor slip to moor boat produces private benefit); see also Comment, supra
note 4, at 834-35.
62. See Lucas v. County of Monterey, 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 135 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1977)
(use of harbor slip). A recent Attorney General opinion indicates that even the right to a
parking space on government land may constitute a possessory interest. 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 143;
see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
63. The requirement of fair warning or nulla poena sine lege is an essential element of
due process in the civil context, just as it is in the criminal context. See Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (vague laws in any area are
constitutionally infirm); Hogan v. Atkins, 411 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1969) (vagueness should be
measured by common understanding and practices). In this case, a standard has at least been
articulated, however weak it has become. See Williams v. Brewer, 442 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
1971) (ambiguous statute not necessarily void for vagueness); Massachusetts Welfare Rights
Org. v. Ott, 421 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1969); but see Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (void for vagueness rule applies in civil cases where standard is so
indefinite as to be no rule at all).
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IV. A SUGGESTION FOR CHANGE
The myriad of problems with the possessory interest test arose
from well-intentioned efforts to define the parameters of such inter-
ests."" A beneficial change in the test must therefore focus on redefin-
ing these parameters.
Any workable definition of a taxable possessory interest must
recognize the implicit and explicit rationale behind the possessory
interest tax. While it would be naive to ignore the fact that the tax
allows counties to generate revenue by taxing land that would other-
wise be exempt, 5 there is nevertheless some merit in the oft-repeated
justifications for the tax: that it is a fair burden to impose upon those
with rights that are recognized and protected by the system; and that
it prevents users of tax-exempt land from obtaining an unfair advan-
tage over their private-sector counterparts. It is clear that some uses
of tax-exempt land are significant enough to warrant the imposition
of tax.
But where shall the line be drawn? What interests are so minor
that the user (who, after all, already pays a permit66 or rental17 fee)
should not be expected to pay a tax in addition? And what interests
are so significant that in fairness the user should be expected to con-
tribute his fair share to the tax base?
The solution to this conundrum lies in the definition of prop-
erty: those interests which rise to the level of a true property right
should be subject to the tax, while mere contractual rights should be
excluded.66 It seems logical that it was this distinction between a
property right and a contractual interest that the courts were at-
tempting to draw by contrasting a lease with a license, 9 and a taxa-
ble possessory interest with a "mere privilege." 70 The distinction has
64. See, e.g., the rationales articulated in People v. Shearer and Mattson v. County of
Contra Costa, supra notes 8 and 15, and accompanying text.
65. The Supreme Court held, as indeed it had to in order to uphold the tax, that the tax
was not a tax on the exempt landowner. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452,
457-62 (1977). The fact remains, however, that a possessory interest tax generates revenue
from the same property.
66. In the case of grazing permits, the fee is based on anticipated usage, calculated in
animal units per month ("AUM's"). An AUM is the amount of grass an adult cow will eat in
a month. Grazing for other animals (horses, calves, sheep, etc.) is calculated as a fraction of an
AUM. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at 539-40; letter to K. Dale from a Susanville
Rancher (Nov. 14, 1983) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review).
67. See McCaslin, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13; United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S.
452.
68. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
69. Kaiser, 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879. See also notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
70. See supra cases cited in note 29.
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intuitive appeal as well; because the possessory interest tax properly
applies only to "property," nonproprietary interests should therefore
be excluded.7
Unfortunately, this distinction raises a new set of problems.
The difference between a property right and a contractual interest
has been the source of much learned debate, and no firm conclusions
appear imminent.
However, there are two major differentiating factors between
contract and property rights. First, a property right, unlike a con-
tractual interest, is inherently freely alienable. That is, property
"ownership" connotes an unfettered ability to sell. Contractual rights
may or may not be alienable; the restriction, if any, will depend on
the terms of the contract and often on the consent of the other con-
tracting party.
Second, a property right not only confers a potential for benefit
upon its holder, it also subjects him to the risk of loss if the "res" is
damaged or destroyed. In a contractual situation, however, impossi-
bility of performance or destruction of the object of the contract has
long been held to excuse further performance and to permit rescis-
sion. The loss, unless otherwise contractually provided, is borne
solely by the owner.
The distinction between a property right and a contractual in-
terest, however, is not always a clear one. What of hybrid instru-
ments such as leases, which have the nature of both a property con-
veyance and a contract? Leases have historically been treated as
conveying property rights; yet the modern trend is to apply contract
principles to the interpretation and enforcement of leases.7
There may be no solution to the property-vs.-contract question
with regard to leases in general. Yet, in this context, the two tests of
alienability and burden-of-risk provide at least a workable starting
point for distinguishing between property and contract rights, and
therefore between interests that should be subject to the possessory
interest tax and interests that should not. These tests are both rea-
sonably easy to apply and produce results that seem logically correct.
For example, a grazing permit that is alienable and in which the
holder has a sufficient investment such that fire damage to the range
would cause more than mere relocation losses,78 should be deemed to
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, REAL PROPERTY § 423 (8th ed.
1973).
73. Relocation or substitution losses would be incurred by any contracting party if the
object of the contract was destroyed. Those with an ownership interest - e.g., permit holders
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convey a property right and therefore a possessory interest. On the
other hand, rights in residential housing related to employment
should virtually never be considered taxable "property" even if
alienable. Although the lessee may be obligated to continue to pay
rent in the 'case of breach by the lessor,7 4 he generally does not stand
to lose more than his relocation costs in the event of destruction of
the house.7'
The concepts of alienability and risk of loss may be useful in
revising the four-factor test to provide a more realistic and workable
standard for possessory interests:
1. The exclusivity test should be returned to a meaningful crite-
rion by requiring that the use in question be truly exclusive. That is,
while different concurrent (but nonconflicting) uses of land may be
allowed, an interest should be the only permitted use of its kind in
order to qualify as exclusive. Multiple identical uses, if restricted to
separate geographical areas, should also be recognized as exclusive.
For instance, separate grazing permits could be issued to Rancher 1
for the North forty acres of a parcel, and to Rancher 2 for the South
forty, with the uses considered exclusive because they do not
overlap.7
,2. The durability test should be strengthened and clarified by
specifying a minimum fixed term, such as five years. Interests in ex-
cess of this term would be conclusively presumed to meet the stan-
dard; interests of shorter duration should be examined to see how
closely they approach the five-year mark and to see how strongly the
other factors are present.
who have prepaid a nonrefundable fee for a five-year term - would suffer a loss greater than
merely finding replacement pasturage. Similarly, those with interests in property for which no
ready replacement exists should be considered to be "at risk" with respect to the interest.
74. Under the traditional view, the covenants were considered independent, and breach
by one party did not excuse performance by the other. The emerging trend, however, is to treat
the obligations as dependent. 3 B. WiTKiN, supra note 72, at § 505 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
75. Upon destruction of the premises, either party may terminate the lease. CAL. CIVIL
CODE §§ 1932(2), 1933(4) (Deering 1981). See also 3 B. WITKIN, supra note 72, at § 497.
76. An interesting problem is posed if Ranchers 1 and 2 share a common water hole in
the middle of the parcel. Use of the water hole is clearly not exclusive under this definition.
However, should this destroy the "exclusivity" of the entire parcel? The more logical conclu-
sion is probably that neither rancher should be held to have a possessory interest in the com-
mon area, but that exclusive possessory rights should be recognized in the remaining areas.
A temporal, as opposed to spatial, division of rights is another matter. If Rancher I had
the right to use the water hole from 8 a.m. to noon, and Rancher 2 could use the water hole
from noon to 4 p.m., should the uses be considered exclusive? Aside from the fact that such a
division of access rights is highly unlikely to occur, the problem posed is more one of durability
than of exclusivity. Even if the rights were considered exclusive, they probably would not meet
the durability test. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
19851
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The concept of continuity should be preserved, but restated to
clarify its basic thrust. Nonconsecutive uses should be recognized as
being "durable" if either the interruption of use is voluntary, or the
hiatus is required by natural forces beyond the control of the user.
An interest should not be considered continuous, and therefore not
durable, where sporadic use of the land is dictated by restrictions on
the interest itself.7
7
3. The independence test should be discarded entirely. It is clear
without regard to a possessory interest test that agents of a tax-ex-
empt principal will not be taxed for their use of public land.7 8
Agency concepts are sufficiently well-developed to make it unneces-
sary-and even ill-advised -to duplicate them with additional crite-
ria within the possessory interest context.
4. The concept of private benefit should be modified to require
not only an opportunity for benefit or gain, but also to provide a
chance of loss.7 ' This test would essentially incorporate an "at risk"
requirement: i.e., is there an investment (with or without a profit
motive) that is subject to loss?"O
It will be noted that under the proposed criteria, many of the
interests currently found to be taxable would not meet this new test
for a possessory interest. *" Rather than undermining the validity of
the proposed test, this observation confirms the extent to which the
current factors have cast an over-inclusive net.
V. FUTURE OF THE TAX: ASSESSOR'S DREAM, TAXPAYERS'
NIGHTMARE
Treatise writers have suggested that "[t]here are almost no lim-
its to which the possessory interest concept can [sic] be pushed,"8
77. In the case of the time-share water hole rights described in note 76, infra, the inter-
est as to the water hole should not be considered continuous because the intermittent use is
established at the discretion of the permit grantor, rather than dictated by natural conditions or
by the user's preference.
78. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
80. A de minimus exception appears already to exist; current law recognizes that certain
otherwise taxable interests may be so small in value that the cost of collection exceeds the
potential revenue. Thus, interests under $2,000 in value are exempted. CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 155.20 (Deering Supp. 1985).
81. For instance, the interests that were held to be taxable in Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d
717; Lucas, 65 Cal. App. 3d. 947; McCaslin, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13; and Sea-Land, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 837, would most likely be exempt under the proposed criteria. The interests in Moore,
12 Cal. 56, and Mattson 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, however, probably would not. See supra notes
73-76 and accompanying text.
82. K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at § 3.7.
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and this assessment seems to be accurate under the current criteria
used by the courts. Interests as minor as government officials' rights
to assigned parking spaces may be subject to the tax;"3 the right to
use public freeways may be next. 4 It has been suggested that the
possessory interest tax could be extended to rights in privately-
owned tax-exempt property;8 5 and a crack has already appeared in
the old rule that possessory interests in government-owned personal
property are not subject to the tax. 6 These are logical-and profita-
ble-areas for expansion and, absent revisions in the current posses-
sory interest analysis, may be expected to be the subject of future
efforts by county assessors to impose the tax.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should make a concerted effort to hold these expansive
tendencies in check by analyzing "new" possessory interests with sig-
nificantly more rigor than was demonstrated in the past. If a new set
of rules is not adopted by the legislature to guide the analysis of
potential possessory interests, there should at the very least, be a de-
liberate attempt to apply the old rules in a meaningful way. It will
be the duty of counsel to insist that courts do so.
83. 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 143 (1979); K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, supra note 1, at § 3.7
(Supp. 1984) (Of course, the Attorney General opinion recognizes that interests worth less
than $2,000 may be exempt under CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 155.20).
84. Presumably, such right of use would exist for a determinable period (the life of each
car), and because two cars cannot occupy the same space at the same time, this usage would be
"exclusive" under the soft definition currently used. Clearly, a benefit is provided.
85. Comment, supra note 4, at 847-48. Such uses are currently exempted under the
welfare exemption excluding the land itself from taxation. Id.
86. See supra note 23. But see General Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51
Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958).
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